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Abstract
Weak property rights are strongly associated with underdevelopment, low
state capacity and civil conflict. In economic models of conflict, outbreaks
of violence require a prize that is both valuable and contestable. This paper
exploits spatial and temporal variation in the availability of land with title that
is contestable by private actors, to explore the relationship between (in)secure
property rights and civil conflict in the Brazilian Amazon. The results sug-
gest that resolving this contestability of title at the local level could eliminate
substantively all local land-related violence but might increase conflict in areas
where title remained contestable.
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Weak property rights are strongly associated with underdevelopment (Acemoglu
et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). The threat of expropriation by state or
non-state actors leads to inefficiently low investment in (contestable) productive
assets and inefficiently high investment in guard labour (Besley, 1995; Besley and
Ghatak, 2010). Where the state fails to develop a monopoly on violence, weak
property rights may lead to civil conflict.
In economic models, for conflict to be profitable two conditions must be satis-
fied. First, there must be something worth taking—the prize must be valuable.1
Second, it must be possible to take it—the prize must be contestable.2 For civil
conflict between non-state actors, the second condition captures the ability of the
state to enforce and protect property rights.
Much of the micro-oriented empirical conflict literature has focussed on the role
of the value of the prize (relative to the outside option).3 Consequently, despite a
prevailing view—backed by cross-country evidence (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003)—
that weak institutions and ineffective states provide the necessary conditions for
conflict, we are still only beginning to unpack the role of specific policies and
institutions.
This paper provides evidence for one such institution in Brazil: secure title over
private land. As in many developing countries (USAID, 2013), land-related conflict
is widespread in the Brazilian Amazon. Between 1997 and 2010, at least 280 mur-
ders, and many more lesser events were directly attributable to land disputes. We
show that, in Amazon municipalities, the share of land where title is potentially
contestable by private actors is strongly associated with (land-related) conflict. In-
deed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that, at the municipal level, substantively all
serious land-related violence is a consequence of insecure titling. However, be-
cause our empirical strategy is a comparison across municipalities over time, and
title over much Amazon land remains contestable, our results may not indicate
large falls in overall conflict. Some conflict may have been diverted to places where
1A lower (opportunity) cost of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Chassang and Miquel, 2009),
is the flip side of a bigger prize, and would be expected to have the same effect.
2In models of conflict as contest functions (e.g. Grossman, 1991; Skaperdas, 1992; Hirshleifer,
1995; Fearon, 2008), contestability would speak to the mapping of conflict ‘effort’ into success.
3For the effect of shocks to the value of the outside option see e.g. Miguel et al. (2004); Hidalgo
et al. (2010); Vanden Eynde (2011); Ferrara and Harari (2013), for the value of the prize see e.g.
Dube and Vargas (2013); Berman and Couttenier (2013); Nunn and Qian (2014); Bazzi and Blattman
(2014). The results of Hidalgo et al. are of particular interest for this study: squatting increases in
Brazil when the value of the outside option is low.
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title remained insecure—our evidence will be suggestive of this.
The contestability land title is enshrined into the Brazilian constitution. Land
not in ‘productive use’ is vulnerable to invasion by squatters, who can develop
the land and appeal to the government for title.4 We proxy for the amount of
contestable land in a municipality by exploiting the expansion of ecological and
protected areas. Once land is protected, it fulfils the productive use requirement
and is thus no longer contestable—even in the absence of economic activity. The
status of surrounding land remains unchanged. We construct a dataset containing
the share of land under protection for the 792 municipalities in the Amazon states
for each year between 1997 and 2010. During this period, the share of Amazon
land under some sort of protection increased markedly, from 16% to 44%, providing
substantial cross-sectional and time-series variation in the availability of contestable
land.
Because the placement of protected areas may be endogenous—indeed, many
protected areas were explicitly placed to prevent further encroachment along the
South East Amazon’s ‘arc of deforestation’—we develop a quasi-event study method-
ology that exploits variation in protection provided by protected areas spanning
multiple municipalities. For the intuition behind this approach, consider a pro-
tected area that straddles two municipalities, A and B, but covers a large portion
of A and a small portion of B. We compare the trajectory of violence in these mu-
nicipalities before and after the protected area is established. As title is no longer
contestable by private actors in a large portion of A, we would expect violence in
A to fall relative to B after establishment. Zooming in on the establishment of in-
dividual protected areas in this way relaxes the identification assumption: all that
is required is that these neighbouring municipalities would have followed parallel
trends in land conflict if the areas had never been established. Because municipal-
ities are relatively small, neighbouring municipalities are similar in terms of land
endowments, distance to the Amazon frontier, enforcement and reporting technol-
ogy; as such, they provide a plausible counterfactual. This approach also allows us
to provide evidence in support of the key parallel trends assumption.
While land-related conflict is strongly predicted by the availability of land with
4Mandates that property must fulfil a ‘social function’ are common. See, for example, Arti-
cle 14 of Germany’s constitution. Similar provisions can be found in many European, and most
Latin American, constitutions. Under common law, laws relating to ‘Adverse Possession’ (squatters
rights) often perform a similar function.
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contestable title, there is no detectable relationship with non-land-related violence
(proxied by homicides). We also do not observe differential changes in economic
activity or an increase in environmental enforcement efforts (proxied by the num-
ber of fines written for environmental infractions). Finally, there are also no appre-
ciable changes in government value added or government spending. The changes
in land-related conflict do not appear to have been a by-product of general changes
in violence, the increased presence of park rangers, differential changes in eco-
nomic activity or a general increase in state presence as captured by our proxies.
As well as rendering land title incontestable, protection also often entails a
change in land ownership. It is therefore possible, that the fall in violence we
document is not due to changes in the amount of land with title contestable held
by private actors, but instead reflects something else about the new owners and
their relations with other actors in the municipality. While we cannot fully rule
this out, we present evidence suggesting a lack of a heterogenous effect by type of
protection status despite quite different accompanying changes in land ownership.
The establishment of indigenous areas, where indigenous claims to private and
public land are formalised, but the interested parties remain the same, do not have
a differential effect on violence compared to the establishment of ecological areas,
where ownership of private lands are often transferred to government. Both types
of change do, however, render the land within incontestable by private actors.
In order to gain title, settlers must clear the land and put it into productive use.
Deforestation, and particularly ‘permanent deforestation’ and agricultural conver-
sion, is a key input into land conflict. Using high-resolution land cover data, we
verify that protection is associated with an increase in forest cover. We then use
sequences of land cover data to provide evidence that the increase in forest cover is
due to lower rates of permanent deforestation; short run deforestation of the type
associated with illegal logging, single season pasture and other temporary activi-
ties actually increases. This pattern of results is consistent with a decline in land
conflict within protected areas, as well as claims that protected areas are successful
in reducing deforestation because they discourage settlers even in the absence of
enforcement (Fearnside, 2003, p. 770), and with previous studies that link weak
property rights in the Amazon with deforestation using qualitative evidence or
more aggregated data (De Oliveira, 2008; Araujo et al., 2009).
This paper is most directly related to a recent literature exploring how specific
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institutions and policies affect civil conflict. For instance, Fetzer (2014) explores
how social insurance can mitigate ‘opportunity cost’ type violence by providing
state-contingent payoffs in the event of adverse productivity shocks; Dell (2015)
shows that anti drug trafficking activities can create a power vacuum that con-
tribute to conflict between gangs; Bazzi and Gudgeon (2015) show how redistricting
can reduce violence by reducing ethnic polarisation; Vanden Eynde (2015) demon-
strates that government violence responds to fiscal incentives; while Besley et al.
(2015) estimate the indirect welfare costs of a breakdown of law and order. By
focussing on the share of land where title is contestable by private actors in the
Brazilian Amazon, this paper is closely related to Alston et al. (1999, 2000), which
show that, in the cross-section, the presence of settlers and a government agency
that assists settlers in claiming title are correlated with land conflict in Brazil. Our
results complement and improve on these findings by exploring the effect of prop-
erty rights over land in a robust empirical framework.
This paper is also related to the large literature exploring the microeconomics of
property rights with relation to credit (Besley, 1995; Field and Torero, 2006; Besley
et al., 2012), investment (Place and Hazell, 1993; Jacoby et al., 2002; Goldstein and
Udry, 2008) and, particularly, guard labour (Field, 2007). Unlike these papers, we
focus directly on the link between contestability and conflict—an essential implicit
ingredient in these papers. Our results suggest that, in addition to providing eco-
nomic benefits, secure property rights are an integral function of an effective and
peaceful state, and that even in the presence of a relatively well functioning gov-
ernment, failure to secure and define property rights can undermine the state’s
monopoly on violence.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides background
on land conflict, property rights and protected areas in Brazil. Section 2 describes
the sources and construction of the data (further details are in Online Appendix
A). Section 3 provides the empirical strategy and results. Section 4 concludes.
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1 Background
1.1 Land Ownership and Conflict
Land ownership in Brazil is highly concentrated. Just 3% of the population own
more than two-thirds of all arable land and land inequality is the highest of the
eighteen developing countries in Griffin et al. (2002). The high concentration of land
ownership is a lasting consequence of colonial land policy. Grants of large estates to
colonialists, under a system similar to feudalism, were later converted into private
holdings. Primogeniture ensured that land ownership did not fragment over time.
After independence, land could be purchased directly from the state or through
secondary markets, but for a long time, sales by the state were restricted to the
elite.
Perhaps in response to high levels of inequality, organisations in favour of land
reform, such as the Brazil Landless Rural Workers Movement, have become increas-
ingly popular and influential. The text of the current (and previous) constitutions
reflect this demand for land reform by requiring that land is adequately and ratio-
nally used in order to fulfil its ‘social function’. If land is not adequately used, it
is vulnerable to invasion by squatters, who are able to appeal for use rights after
a year of productive use, and title after five years. The threshold for productive
use is vaguely defined (and varies across space), but, in the Amazon, it certainly
requires a significant share of land to be cleared.
The expropriation of land is managed by the National Institute of Colonisation
and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). To obtain title and use rights, squatters apply to
INCRA. The extent of INCRA’s activities are limited by budgetary constraints—
chiefly the requirement that INCRA compensate incumbent landowners at ‘mar-
ket rates’. Nevertheless, since 1988, INCRA have settled over a million house-
holds on more than 75 million hectares of land. In many cases, squatting is an
entrepreneurial act. According to de Almeida and Campari (1996), settlers often
move ahead of the Amazon frontier, clear land and develop a legal claim, before ul-
timately selling the land to commercial ranchers as nearby infrastructure improves.
For these squatters, gaining title is central to their business model.
Despite the requirement that landowners be compensated for their loss, the
involuntary nature of expropriations, and often inadequate levels of compensation,
mean that land invasions have the potential to create conflict between squatters
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and incumbent landowners. Alston et al. (1999, 2000) show that the presence of
INCRA, the agency which grants title to settlers, is strongly associated with more
violence in the cross section, suggesting that the fear of losing title may exacerbate
conflict. However, because the presence of INCRA is endogenous to the presence
of settlers, and other factors associated with land conflict, the extent to which the
relationship is causal, or how important it is as an overall driver of conflict, is
not clear. Conflict between settlers and incumbent landowners is by no means
the only form of land-related conflict in the Amazon. Poorly maintained land
registries create the potential for conflict between settlers themselves, and settlers
have often clashed with fazendeiros (cattle ranchers), who employ gunmen to chase
settlers from their lands (Schmink and Wood, 1992; Dorner and Thiesenhusen, 1992;
Cleuren, 2001).
1.2 Protected Areas in the Brazilian Amazon
The Amazon is among the last remaining ecosystems not subject to anthropogenic
changes. It is also a major carbon trap, absorbing 2.2 billion tonnes of CO2 each
year (Espı´rito-Santo et al., 2014). If climate change and biodiversity loss are to be
minimised, limiting Amazon forest loss will be crucial. Despite this, until rela-
tively recently, the prevailing view in Brazil was that the Amazon was a frontier
to be conquered and incorporated into the productive sector (Andersen et al., 2002;
Angelsen, 2010).
In recent years, Brazilian policy towards the Amazon has focussed on protection
rather than exploitation. The share of Amazon land that private landowners are
legally required to keep forested was increased to 80% in 1996 (with little immedi-
ate impact). Large swathes of the Amazon have been designated as ecologically or
tribally protected.5 The agreement of a cross-ministry Action Plan for Prevention
and Control of the Legal Amazon Deforestation in late 2004, the subsequent es-
tablishment of the Brazilian Forestry Service (Servic¸o Florestal Brasileiro) in 2006,
improved satellite monitoring, and the blacklisting of municipalities with excessive
deforestation have led to more effective enforcement and a range of complementary
5While tribal protection does not de jure provide as stringent formal protection as some forms
of ecological areas, it does close the land to settlers and ranchers and curtails resource extraction.
Nolte et al. (2013) find that tribal protection is more effective than ecological protection, suggesting
that the presence of tribes aid enforcement.
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policies (Assunc¸a˜o and Gandour, 2013; Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2013; Nepstad et al., 2014;
Assunc¸a˜o and Rocha, 2014; Cisneros et al., 2015). Together, these policies seem
to have substantially reduced the rate of deforestation. Official (PRODES) figures
indicate that deforestation of virgin forest increased from 13,000km2 in 1997 to a
peak of nearly 28,000km2 in 2004 before declining to 7,000km2 in 2010.
Protection and Contestability. This paper will exploit a side effect of protection:
that when land is protected, title is effectively rendered incontestable. This hap-
pens because when land is protected for ecological purposes, it is automatically
considered to satisfy its ‘social function’, even in the absence of economic activity.
Land clearance no longer provides squatters with a legal claim on the land, and
hence protection ‘eliminates the expectation of future possible legalisation of land
tenure’ (Senior official in charge of deforestation control cited in Abranches, 2013,
p. 25). Similarly, when land is tribally protected, indigenous groups are granted
exclusive rights over land use, although not underlying mineral rights, and claims
by non-indigenous third parties are annulled (Hutchison et al., 2006, p.13). At a
municipal level then, an increase in the share of land under indigenous or environ-
mental protection represents a reduction in the availability of land with contestable
title.
Where gets Protected. Our empirical strategy will exploit the expansion of pro-
tected areas, and hence changes in the amount of land with contestable title, to
explore the effect of insecure property rights on violence. Understanding how
protected areas were placed will be crucial for the interpretation of the results as
non-random placement creates the potential for bias.
The principal stated reason for ecological protection is the preservation of forest
and forest ecosystems. However, because planners have used ecological (and most
likely, economic, Anderson et al., 2015) criteria to decide where to place protected
areas, they are not likely to have been randomly assigned.
The principles underpinning the expansion of the system of ecologically pro-
tected areas were outlined in proposals emerging from the 1999 workshop on the
establishment of protected areas (Capobianco et al., 2001). Two principles were
emphasised: protected areas should constrain the advance of the Amazon frontier
and/or protect parts of the Amazon of particular ecological value. While specific
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recommendations for the location of protected areas were not closely followed, the
principles survived. New protected areas have encircled encroaching deforestation
near the Amazon river and in the South-East Amazon (see Figure 1).
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The systematic placement of protected areas in the path of encroaching de-
forestation could bias our estimates of the effect of the availability of contestable
land on violence downwards. As the frontier approached, land will have become
more valuable, and hence more desirable to squatters and incumbent landowners,
increasing the intensity of conflict. On the other hand, if planners sought to min-
imise the economic cost of protected areas, they may have been placed in relatively
low-value locations, biasing our estimates upwards. To mitigate these types of bias,
our preferred strategy will exploit variation only from neighbouring municipalities,
where underlying desirability is relatively similar.
In some respects, the placement of indigenous areas is more straightforward:
they are historic tribal territories. Demarcation of Indian lands is the responsibility
of Fundac¸a¨o Nacional do I´ndio (FUNAI), a Brazilian government agency respon-
sible for Indian affairs. The process of demarcation is quite formalised, beginning
with an anthropological survey and ending with a presidential decree and a trans-
fer of ownership from incumbent landowners to tribes. In practice, the establish-
ment of tribal areas and their boundaries are frequently contested (Hutchison et al.,
2006) and landowners have sometimes been successful in preventing, or at least
delaying, the establishment of tribal lands.
Process of Protection. Since 2000, the creation of new protected areas, and the
status of existing areas, has been governed by Brazil’s National System of Con-
servation Units (Crawford and Pignataro, 2007). Environmentally protected areas
fall into two main types, ‘Complete Protection’ and ‘Sustainable Use’. The regu-
lations governing the creation of protected areas and the exploitation of resources
contained within differ by type. However, in all cases, settlers are no longer able to
develop a claim on title by clearing land.
Before ecological protected areas of any kind can be established, a consultation
must be held with the local population and conservation experts. For indigenous
reserves, a participative ethnographic survey is carried out, which results in a pro-
posal for demarcation. Protected areas can be established by federal, state and
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municipal governments, as well as by private landowners, although, in practice,
the overwhelming majority of protected areas are created by state or federal level
governments. On establishment, for most types of reserve, any private land is
subject to compulsory purchase by government, in principle, at fair market value.6
While the precise formula for compensation is not clear, systematic deviations
from fair market value could lead to an anticipatory effect on conflict as protected
areas can be ‘proposed’ for many years before final approval. If compensation was
above (below) the market value of land, we would expect an increase (decrease) in
conflict in the run up to establishment. Because of this, we will later be careful to
document the absence of a significant anticipatory effect.
In addition to compensation for landowners, some states have implemented fis-
cal transfers to municipalities which provide ecological services (including having
land protected). Of the nine states encompassing the legal Amazon, five currently
apportion some revenues in this way. For most municipalities these transfers are
a tiny portion of total revenues, so one would not expect a large effect on public
service provision. Nevertheless, in Online Appendix B.1, we show that our results
are robust to excluding municipalities that could ever have been eligible for these
types of transfers.
2 Data
The previous section suggested that insecurity of property rights could be an im-
portant factor behind land-related conflict in the Brazilian Amazon; that deforest-
ing land may be a key way of obtaining title; and that protected areas may securely
assign property rights and hence reduce the scope for conflict. This section de-
scribes the data on conflict, deforestation and protection used in the paper.
2.1 Conflict Data
We obtain data on land conflict from the annual reports of the Comissa˜o Pastoral da
Terra (CPT). The CPT was founded by the Catholic Church to highlight the plight
of landless workers, small farmers and squatters. Since 1985, it has published an
6For some types of sustainable use reserves, landowners may retain title if their plans for the
land are consistent with the rules governing that type of area. If not, government must purchase
the land at the prevailing rate.
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annual report on land-related violence (Conflitos no Campo). This report includes
municipal level data on measures of land-related conflict, including land-related
murders, attempted murders, death threats, and other disputes.7
We link the data to the municipalities defined in the 2000 census. Because
Brazilian municipalities are occasionally subdivided, we assign violence data from
municipalities formed after 2000 to their parent municipalities. In the early 1990s,
municipality splitting was widespread, so, to maximise the number of comparable
units, we focus on years from 1997.
The CPT compile the data from the reports of local newspapers and church
organisations. As such, the data will inevitably understate the true level of con-
flict and suffer from reporting error. To increase power, our principal outcome
measures will combine types of violent conflict together. To reduce measurement
error, our focus will be on the most extreme events. Our most inclusive measure,
escalations, combines murders, attempted murders and death threats. Our most
preferred measure, violence, drops death threats to reduce the scope for reporting
error. To ensure our results are not driven by a few outlying observations, we also
report results for a dummified measure of violence (any violence). For reference,
we also provide our baseline results for each of the disaggregated measures of vi-
olence. Finally, although not preferred, we present results based on the broadest
measure of land conflict published by the CPT, disputes, which captures disputes
over land boundaries, irrigation and other such conflicts, and is hence most subject
to reporting error.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]]
Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of violence (left) and escalations (right)
across Brazil for the period 1997-2010. Violence was overwhelmingly concentrated
in the Amazon region, so we focus on municipalities in the Amazon states.8 Sum-
mary statistics are included in Table 1. Land-related violence was a common oc-
currence in our sample: on average there were 21 land-related murders per year, a
similar number of land-related attempted murders and many more death threats.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
7Further details on data sources and assembly are provided in Online Appendix A.1
8Acre, Amazonas, Amapa, Maranhao, Mato Grosso, Para, Rondonia, Roraima and Tocantins.
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2.2 Protected Areas
To identify the expansion of protected areas in Brazil, we use digital maps detailing
the location and original boundaries of each protected area and the date the pro-
tected area was established. We combine this data with the 2000 census municipal
boundaries to produce a municipal level panel. The data allow us to calculate the
share of municipal land area that is protected for each year up to 2010. Details
of sources, and how the data were created, are provided in Online Appendix A.2.
There was a substantial increase in the share of the Amazon under ecological or
tribal protection over our sample period. Figure 3 plots the protected share of land
over time. In 1997 16% of the Amazon region was under protection, by 2010 44%
was.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
2.3 Forest Cover and Deforestation
To explore the impact of protection on land use change we use MODIS land cover
data (Channan et al., 2014). MODIS classifies land cover into 19 categories, at
a 500m resolution, for each year since 2001. We collapse the 19 raw categories
into 4 groups, ‘Forest’ (MODIS categories 1-5), ‘Shrubland’ and grassland, (6-10),
‘Cropland’ (12 and 14), and ‘other’ (water and urban areas). In the Amazon region,
97% of coordinate-year observations are either forested, shrubland or cropland.
We attach the MODIS data, and a large quantity of other geographic data includ-
ing information on protected status, to 793,928 randomly drawn coordinates and
generate a coordinate level panel of land cover data.
We consider the effect of protection on both the propensity for a coordinate to
be forested at a given point in time and the probability of observing sequences of
land use associated with different types of land use. More specifically, we use a ma-
chine learning algorithm to classify sequences of land use into groups with similar
properties. We then manually classify the resulting groups as being indicative of
either ‘permanent forest cover’, ‘temporary deforestation’ or ‘permanent deforesta-
tion’ and create a dummy variable for each type Stci.
9 Land cover data is available
from 2001-12, so in our baseline specification we use sequences covering five years
9A full description of this how we implement this classification is provided in Online Appendix
A.3.
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(either 2001-05 or 2008-12).10 To fix ideas, the sequence FFFFF is classified as per-
manently forested, FSSFF is classified as temporarily forested, and CCCSC and
FCCCC are classified as permanently deforested.
3 Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section, we first consider how the availability of land with title contestable
by private actors drives land-related conflict in the Amazon. Our results will in-
dicate that, at the local level, substantively all land-related violence appears to be
a consequence of weakly defined property rights. Additional results will suggest
that at least some of this conflict was diverted elsewhere. We show that protection
was not associated with differential changes in economic activity, levels of non land
related violence, environmental enforcement (as proxied by fines), or measures of
the size of local government. We then turn to a key input into land-related con-
flict, land clearance, to provide suggestive corroborating evidence of a decline in
conflict by considering changes in land use patterns. We show that while protec-
tion appears to reduce deforestation, it does so only by preventing the permanent
deforestation required to obtain and retain title—temporary deforestation actually
increases.
3.1 Contestable Land and Conflict
Panel Specification. We use two main empirical specifications to explore how the
contestability of land title between private actors contributes to land conflict in
Brazil. The first is based on the full panel of Amazon region municipalities. We
estimate the following OLS specification:
Yijt = αi + γjt + βProtectedShareijt + eijt (1)
Where Yijt is some measure of land conflict, αi is a municipality fixed effect
and γjt is a state-by-time fixed effect. The inclusion of this rich set of fixed effects
non-parametrically controls for time-invariant differences in municipal levels of
conflict and state-specific economic, cultural and policy changes over time. As a
10Our results are robust to using sequences of alternative length (see Online Appendix Table
A13).
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consequence, this specification exploits only within state variation. As protection
renders land title incontestable, the protected share of land provides a time varying
proxy for the municipal level (inverse) share of land with contestable title.
Panel Results. Columns 1-3 of Table 2 Panel A report results for our preferred
aggregated measures of violence: escalation, violence, and a dummy indicating vi-
olence > 0. For reference, columns 4-6 provide results for disaggregated measures
of violence. Column 7 contains results for all recorded disputes, including minor
incidents.
For each outcome, an increase in the share of land under protection—and hence
a decrease in the availability of contestable land—is associated with lower levels of
land conflict. The estimated effects are large, similar in magnitude (relative to
the mean), and are generally consistent with local conflict being completely driven
by the availability of contestable land. Two out of three of our preferred ‘aggre-
gated violence’ measures, which maximise power, are significant at the 5% level.
Not surprisingly, disaggregating the measures of violence reduces statistical power,
and only the effect on attempted murders remains statistically significant (and this
at the 10% level). The effect on disputes, which may suffer from quite uneven
reporting, is also insignificant.
To interpret these estimates as causal, we require that—conditional on the fixed
effects—the error term is uncorrelated with the share of protected land. In prac-
tice, this assumption has two components. First, that protection is assigned in an
‘as good as random’ fashion. Second, that the reporting of conflict is not itself
endogenous to the protected share of land. The first would be violated if, for ex-
ample, changes in protection and conflict were both consequences of an advancing
Amazon frontier (the distance of the forest from undeveloped land). The second
would be violated if, for example, protected areas made local newspapers differ-
ently interested in land-related issues.
We can reassure ourselves somewhat by exploring the extent to which the es-
timated effect changes when estimated under different specifications. In Online
Appendix Table A1, we provide results for specifications with less demanding time
fixed effects and/or municipality specific time trends. In each case the estimated
coefficients are similar, mitigating concerns over the presence of geographically
correlated shocks or differential municipal trends.
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Quasi-Event Study Specification. Despite the robustness of the results to changes
in specification, concerns over whether the documented relationship is a causal one
must remain. To help establish causality, we refine our approach, and significantly
relax the identification assumption, by exploiting the geographic features of the
data.
The intuition behind this ‘quasi-event’ approach is straightforward. Many pro-
tected areas have boundaries which span more than one protected area. We think
of each of these protected areas as an event that treats all intersecting municipal-
ities. These municipalities are not, however, treated equally, and the intensity of
treatment varies depending on how much of the municipality is protected. Figure
4 illustrates the approach. The dark shaded areas are four municipalities that are
treated by the light gray protected area: while almost 1/3 of Monte Alegre’s land
area is protected, only a small share of Obidos’ is. We thus zoom in on these mu-
nicipalities, and others like them, and compare the trajectory of violence between
these differentially affected municipalities.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The dataset for the quasi-event study approach is constructed as follows. For
each protected area, we identify the set of municipalities where some land is newly
protected. We calculate treatment intensity for each municipality, by calculating
the share of municipal land protected by that specific area.11 The conflict data is
added, and the dataset stacks the set of municipality-year observations for all pro-
tected areas.12 With this data, we estimate the following difference-in-differences
specification
Yikt = αik + γkt + βPost× ShareProtectedikt + eikt (2)
where αik is a municipality-by-protected area fixed effect and γkt is a protected
11For consistency with our panel results, we define intensity as the share of land in the munic-
ipality that is newly protected by the particular protected area. However, similar results (modulo
scaling effects) are obtained if treatment intensity is defined as the share of unprotected land area
protected (see Online Appendix Table A3).
12Because some municipalities contain parts of more than one protected area the same munici-
pality can appear in the data more than once. To obtain consistent standard errors in spite of this
constructed auto-correlation, we two-way cluster our errors at both the municipality and ‘protected
area’ level.
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area-by-time fixed effect.
The identification assumption is that of parallel trends: in the absence of the
establishment of the protected area, changes in conflict in municipalities more
affected by the protected area would not have been systematically different to
changes in less affected neighbouring municipalities. The inclusion of this demand-
ing set of fixed effects means we are exploiting variation that exists only within sets
of municipalities sharing common protected areas (like the four illustrated in Fig-
ure 4). On average, protected areas (or expansions of protected areas) that span
more than one municipality intersect with 2.98 municipalities. There are 209 pro-
tected areas of this type in our data. Because municipalities are relatively small, the
areas we are zooming in on are geographically similar and are much more likely
to have comparable data reporting quality due to the presence of shared local me-
dia and church groups. One weakness of this approach is that, to the extent that
land invasions are diverted to nearby municipalities, the results will overstate the
impact of well-defined property rights on land-related conflict.13 Indeed, we will
present evidence suggestive of exactly this type of diversionary effect.
Quasi-Event Study Results. Table 2 Panel B contains the results. They are broadly
consistent with those estimated in the panel setting: reducing the amount of land
with contestable title dramatically reduces land-related conflict. The estimated
coefficients are larger (in absolute terms) than those estimated in the panel speci-
fication, suggesting that either some of the effect of protection is to divert conflict
into nearby unprotected areas or that protected areas tend to be placed in areas
where conflict would otherwise increase (like the Amazon frontier).14 Later results
will be indicative of both effects. Coefficients on our preferred aggregate outcomes
are significant at the 5% level or higher, while those on disaggregated measures are
significant at the 10% level or higher.
It is impossible to directly verify whether the parallel trends assumption re-
13While the basic panel specification is also likely to suffer from this, the effects are greatly
exacerbated by using only neighbouring municipalities as controls.
14An alternative possibility is that the differences could be due to the different set of municipal-
ities used in the quasi-event study specification compared to the panel specification. The results
contained in Online Appendix A2 indicate that this change is not driving the result: when we
restrict the sample in the panel specification to municipalities featured in the quasi-event specifi-
cation, the estimated coefficients are similar to those estimated in the panel specification using all
municipalities.
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quired for a causal interpretation of the coefficients would have held in the absence
of the establishment of protected areas. We can, however, evaluate whether parallel
trends held before establishment. To this end, we estimate coefficients on the area
protected by specific protected areas for the seven years surrounding establishment.
Yikt = αik + γkt +
3
∑
s=−2
βs (ShareProtectedi × 1[TimeToProtection = s]) + eikt (3)
In this specification, the βs’s captures the correlation between the share of land
to be protected and violence in the years before and after the introduction of the
protected area. We focus on protected areas where outcome data is available for at
least three years before and after establishment, and drop observations outside this
seven-year window. This means that each coefficient is estimated on a consistent
set of protected areas.
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The coefficients for our three main measures are plotted in Figure 5. Not sur-
prisingly, the estimated coefficients on each year are not generally significant. How-
ever, for each measure of violence, the pattern is clear. There were no differen-
tial trends in violence before or after the establishment of the protected area, but
there was a pronounced fall in violence around the time of establishment. Because
landowners are compensated for conversion of land to protected status, conflict
over land rights continues right up to demarcation.
The large effect size we observe when zooming into neighbouring municipali-
ties suggests that securing property rights in one location may lead to conflict in
nearby locations. One natural question is, how far do these local spillovers ex-
tend? To explore this, we re-estimate our event study specification, but expand
the ‘control’ region, by first adding the municipalities adjacent to the intersecting
municipalities, first-degree adjacency, and then second, adding the municipalities
that are adjacent to the adjacent municipalities, second-degree adjacency. We also re-
estimate our panel specification with a variable indicating the share of land that is
unprotected but less than 10km from the boundary of a protected area.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3 contains these results. Panel A contains the panel results, the estimated
coefficients on the share of land within 10km of a protected area are suggestive
of local spillovers, but the coefficients are imprecisely estimated and not statisti-
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cally significant.15 Panels B and C extend the event study control region to first
and second-degree adjacent municipalities. In both specifications, the estimated
coefficients halve in absolute size, however, because the coefficients are imprecisely
estimated, the differences are only statistically significant in 2 of 8 regressions (p-
values from 0.05 to 0.31). Nevertheless, these results suggest that there is a sig-
nificant diversion of violence to nearby areas, but these effects appear to be quite
local as there are no economic or statistically significant differences in estimates
based on including first or first and second-degree adjacent municipalities. Our
empirical strategy and data do not allow us to evaluate whether conflict is diverted
over longer distances, however, given that national organisations like the Movi-
mento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra help coordinate the actions of settlers, we should
not discount this possibility. The apparent diversionary effect of protection on con-
flict helps reconcile the difference in effect sizes obtained when using the panel
or quasi-event specifications and are in line with the findings of previous studies
showing that the location of conflict is sensitive to local enforcement efforts, with
the implication that local enforcement can impose negative municipalities on other
areas (Bandiera, 2003; Dell, 2015).
Effects through other channels? We argue that the changes in land-related con-
flict observed are due to falls in the availability of contestable land. However, if the
establishment of protected areas was associated with improved policing, changes
in economic activity, more robust environmental enforcement, or an otherwise ex-
panded government presence, then this could suggest other factors at work. In
Table 4 we document that this does not appear to have been the case.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Columns 1 and 2 indicate that there was no statistically significant effect on
total homicides or homicides of indigenous persons, and the estimated coefficients
are of opposite sign. These results do not indicate an accompanying improvement
in general law and order. (Unfortunately, data on other crimes are not available at
the municipal level.)
Columns 3 and 4 indicate no statistically significant effect on fines levied by the
environmental protection agency (IBAMA). Fines levied in the Amazon typically
15The average municipality has 13% of land within 10km of a protected area, compared to 20%
inside one. Other sized buffer regions had similar inconclusive effects (not reported).
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sanction violations of the forest code. The vast majority of the fines are never col-
lected, though the fact fines are levied is suggestive of the degree of state presence.
We distinguish between the total number of fines and the number of fines classified
as ‘flora’ violations (which constitute 75% of all fines in the Amazon). Notably, and
despite statistical insignificance, the estimated effect in the panel specification is
large and positive compared to the mean, whereas in the event-study specification
it is relatively small and negative. This difference is consistent with the Brazilian
government’s stated policy of placing protected areas to encircle encroaching de-
forestation (and, consequently, with our panel estimates of the effect of protection
on conflict likely being too small in absolute terms).
Columns 5 and 6 indicate no statistically significant effects on either municipal
GDP or agricultural value added. Protection is not accompanied by significant
economic changes. As with enforcement, the estimated coefficients are positive in
the panel specification and negative in the quasi-event specification, which is again
suggestive of protected areas being placed to constrain encroaching deforestation.16
Columns 7 and 8 indicate statistically there was also no significant effect on gov-
ernment sector value added or municipal government expenditure. Protection is
not accompanied by significant changes in the total size of municipal governments.
In Section 1.2, we noted that some states provide fiscal transfers to municipal gov-
ernments based on the amount of land under protection. We show that our results
are not driven by these specific transfers in Online Appendix Section B.1.
As indicated in Section 1.2, the establishment of protected areas often entails a
change in ownership of the lands contained within. These changes in ownership
have the potential to affect the returns to land-related conflict for reasons unrelated
to contestability of land title and thus provide an alternative explanation for our
results.
The preceding analysis pooled indigenous and protected areas on the grounds
that both types of area render title over the land incontestable. However, in other
respects, the transfers of ownership associated with the establishment of indige-
nous and ecological areas is quite different. In ecological areas, private lands are
often purchased by the government. In indigenous areas, tribal claims to private
and public lands are formalised. Consequently, while indigenous areas lead to less
16Given that protection is intended to limit economic exploitation of the forest, the true effect
ought to be weakly negative.
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public land, but little change in the potential for conflict between indigenous and
other groups, ecological areas increase the amount of public land (possibly affect-
ing state presence) and reduce the scope for conflict between formerly incumbent
landowners and settlers. Given these differences, if the effects were being driven
by other factors relating to changes in ownership we might expect indigenous and
ecological areas to have quite distinct effects on conflict. Conversely, if the decline
in conflict was due to land being rendered incontestable the estimated effects ought
to be quite similar.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Table 5 explores this by allowing ecological and indigenous areas to have differ-
ent effects. The estimated effects of the two types of areas are similar in magnitude.
In half the regressions ecological areas have a larger effect, in the other half the ef-
fect of tribal areas is larger. In seven of eight specifications, there is no statistically
significant difference in the estimated coefficients (p-values from 0.43 to 0.96). In
the eighth, the difference in coefficients is significant at the 10% level. To the extent
that factors associated with changing ownership are behind the decline in violence,
these factors appear to be common to transfers of ownership to indigenous peoples
and to governments. Rendering land incontestable clearly fits the bill, but it is less
obvious that changes in state presence or the set of interested parties do.
The Online Appendix provides several additional robustness checks. From 2007
some municipalities were ‘blacklisted’ on the basis of poor performance in environ-
mental protection, one consequence of which is that there was a greater subsequent
focus on deforestation and land policy in these municipalities. In Online Appendix
Table A6, we show that our results are robust to excluding these municpalities.
In a similar vein, Brazil agreed the cross-ministry Action Plan for Prevention and
Control of the Legal Amazon Deforestation (PPCDAM) in late 2004 which may
have improved monitoring and reduced deforestation and market a turning point
in overall deforestation trends (e.g. Assunc¸a˜o and Gandour, 2013; Assunc¸a˜o et al.,
2013; Nepstad et al., 2014). This may have increased government presence in and
around protected areas potentially confounding the result. In Online Appendix
Table A5, we allow the effect of protection to vary pre and post PPCDAM. The
interactions are of inconsistent sign and do not indicate a change in the effect on
conflict. However, the estimates are imprecise and we may lack the power to iden-
tify differences in effect sizes. Lastly, Alston et al. (1999, 2000) emphasise the crucial
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role of INCRA in facilitating land conflict and property rights uncertainty. In On-
line Appendix Section B.2, we show that our results are not driven by an association
with protection and INCRA activities.
3.2 Protection, Deforestation and Patterns of Land Use Change
Contestability of land title appears to be an important contributory factor in Brazil’s
high levels of land-related conflict. As discussed in Section 1, agricultural conver-
sion helps settlers obtain title and landowners avoid expropriation. This suggests
that protection ought to reduce deforestation in general—as the results of Nep-
stad et al. (2006), Soares-Filho et al. (2006) and Nolte et al. (2013), but not Anderson
et al. (2015), indicate—but particularly reduce ‘permanent’ deforestation of the type
associated with agricultural conversion.
In this section, we use high-resolution land cover data based on satellite imag-
ing to provide suggestive evidence that (a) protected areas reduce deforestation,
and (b) that they do so by discouraging permanent deforestation. Indeed, our es-
timates will indicate that protected areas experience more temporary deforestation
of the type associated with logging and single season agriculture. These results
are consistent with protected areas reducing deforestation by rendering land title
incontestable—the mechanism by which we argue that protected areas also reduce
violence. Nevertheless, because agricultural conversion could also decline in pro-
tected areas for other reasons, e.g. settlers may no longer anticipate improvements
in market access or they may fear conflict with environmental agencies or indige-
nous peoples, these results primarily represent the absence of evidence against our
proposed mechanism rather than decisive evidence in its favour.
Empirical specification for deforestation and land use. We estimate the effect of
protection on forest cover and land use using a ‘long differences’ specification. The
unit of observation is a coordinate c. As described in Section 2.3, for each coordi-
nate we have coded a set of dummies indicating whether the coordinate is forested
in any given year Ftci and whether patterns of land use over two five-year periods
are most consistent with ‘permanent forest cover’, ‘temporary deforestation’, or
‘permanent deforestation’ St−t+4ci .
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Our estimating equation is thus
∆Yci = γi + β× ∆Protectedci + eci (4)
where ∆Yci indicates changes in forest cover (∆Fci = F2010ci − F2001ci ) or changes in
sequences of land use (∆Sci = S2008−12ci − S2001−05ci ) and γi is a state fixed effect. As
elsewhere, we exploit only within-state variation.
As discussed previously, because protection is not randomly assigned, selection
into protected status may bias the results. To somewhat mitigate this type of bias,
we also provide results estimated using a matched subsample of coordinates. We
match (without replacement) coordinates whose protection status changes between
2001 and 2010 (treated coordinates) with coordinates whose protected status never
changes (control coordinates) based on their estimated probability of being in each
group. We retain observations where the absolute difference in propensity score
between the matched pairs is less than 0.001.17
Propensity scores were estimated with probit regressions using a large num-
ber of geographic and economic inputs. Online Appendix Table A10 contains the
results of the matching regression. Compared to coordinates whose protection
status never changed, newly protected coordinates were more likely to be forested
(see also Table 1), tended to be at intermediate distances from human habitation (as
proxied by distance from night-lights), were closer to rivers, further north-west, and
had relatively high value agricultural yields. On this basis, it is unclear whether
we should expect protected areas to be more or less at risk from deforestation.
Results for deforestation and land use. Table 6 columns 1 and 2 contain the
results for forest cover. Protection is associated with a relative increase in the prob-
ability that a coordinate is forested of 1.5 percentage points in the full sample and
1.9 percentage points in the matched sample. The estimates are significant at the
1% level. While not definitively causal, protection is robustly associated with lower
levels of deforestation.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Results based on sequences of land use are in columns 3-8.18 Regardless of the
17We show that the results are robust to other choices of thresholds in Online Appendix Tables
A11 and A12.
18For consistency with the results in columns 1 and 2, we use the same set of matched coordi-
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sample, the results are striking. Protection decreases the probability of permanent
deforestation by roughly 1 percentage point (somewhat more in the unmatched
data, less in the matched data) and this change is significant at the 1% level in
the full sample and the 10% level in the matched sample. This decrease in per-
manent deforestation is offset by roughly equal sized increases in both temporary
deforestation and permanent forest cover. In the full sample, these estimates are
significant the 5% level or higher, but only the effect on temporary deforestation
is significant (at the 5% level) in the matched sample. Compared to the baseline
probability of being temporarily or permanently deforested the estimated effects
are large. In the matched sample, protection increases the probability of a se-
quence being temporarily deforested by around 1/3 of the mean and reduces the
probability of permanent deforestation by around 8% of the mean.
Put together, these results suggest that protected areas reduce deforestation
and that they do so by discouraging permanent deforestation. Indeed, consistent
with the weak enforcement of protected areas, temporary deforestation actually in-
creases suggesting some substitutability between types of forest exploitation. Given
the empirical specification and the non-random assignment of protection, these re-
sults are suggestive rather than definitive. Nevertheless, this pattern is consistent
Fearnside (2003, p. 770) which argues that protected areas reduce deforestation
by discouraging settlers. This pattern is also the expected one given the effect of
protection on land-related violence.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that the availability of land with title contestable
by private actors is an important force behind Brazil’s high levels of land-related
conflict. We exploited the fact that, at the municipal level, expansion of protected
areas renders the land with incontestable. Regardless of specification, municipali-
ties with less contestable land experienced less land-related violence. There was no
evidence of accompanying changes in enforcement, non-land-related homicides,
nates. However, not all coordinates whose protection status change between 2001-10, will have their
protection status change between 2001-08 so some coordinates that were ‘treated’ in columns 1 and
2 are untreated in columns 3-8. The results are robust to defining sequences as ‘treated’ if they
were protected by 2010, or to other plausible ways of defining a sequence as treated (see Online
Appendix Table A15 and the associated text).
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government presence or prosperity. To highlight the mechanism, we showed that
protected areas reduce deforestation, but only permanent deforestation—the type
of deforestation associated with land-related conflict—temporary deforestation ac-
tually increased. This paper contributes to an emerging literature which explores
the effect of specific policies and institutional factors on civil conflict and begins to
unpack the robust cross-country correlation between civil conflict and weak insti-
tutions.
Thiemo Fetzer, University of Warwick
Samuel Marden, University of Sussex
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A. Protected Areas in 1997 B. Protected Areas in 2010
Figure 1: Figures illustrating the expansion of protected areas between 1997 (left) and 2010 (right). The protected
areas that were added between 1997 and 2010 are shaded dark.
30
Figure 2: Municipality level counts of land-related conflict escalations (left) and violence (right) over 1997 to 2010. The
Amazon states are indicated by the solid black border. Violence is the sum of land-related murders and attempted
murders, escalations adds death threats.
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Figure 3: Share of land in the Amazon states under ecological or tribal protection
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Figure 4: Illustrates the intuition for the quasi-event study specification: we compare municipalities that are differ-
ently treated by the same protected area. Here, the dark area is the four municipalities that intersect, and are hence
treated by, the light grey protected area. The light grey protected area does not treat each municipality equally—
Monte Alegre is much more affected then Obidos—and the quasi-event study exploits this differential intensity of
treatment and compares conflict before and after the protected area was established.
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Escalation Violence Any Violence
Figure 5: Conflict before and after the establishment of protected areas. The vertical line indicates the introduction of
a protected area. The line with markers plots OLS estimates of the interaction between the time to the introduction
of protected area and the share of the municipality protected. Estimates obtained using the quasi-event specification
with a balanced panel of protected areas covering the seven years surrounding the introduction of the protected
area. Dotted lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. Errors two-way clustered at the municipality and protected area
levels.
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Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics
Mean s.d. N
Municipality Level Land Conflict Variables
Escalations 0.173 1.141 11,088
Violence 0.045 0.38 11,088
Violence Dummy 0.024 0.153 11,088
Murders 0.026 0.247 11,088
Attempted Murders 0.019 0.229 11,088
Death Threats 0.128 0.993 11,088
Disputes 0.315 1.114 11,088
Other Municipal Variables
Homicides for any Reason (all) 6.479 32.35 11,088
Homicides for any Reason (Indigenous) 0.030 0.286 11,088
Environmental Fines Issued (count all) 12.655 42.13 11,088
Environmental Fines Issued (count flora) 9.548 35.023 11,088
Log GDP (1999-2010) 10.918 1.264 9,504
Log Agricultural GDP (1999-2010) 9.572 1.114 9,504
Log Public Sector Value Added (1999-2010) 9.662 1.112 9504
Log Public Sector Expenditure (2000-2010, fewer municipalities) 9.954 1.04 7736
Protected Share of Land (1997) 0.155 0.277 792
Protected Share of Land (2010) 0.243 0.328 792
Coordinate Level Data
Forested (2001-2010) 0.683 0.465 7.93m
... if matched sample 0.878 0.327 1.67m
Shrubland (2001-2010) 0.239 0.427 7.93m
... if matched sample 0.083 0.276 1.67m
Cropland (2001-2010) 0.049 0.216 7.93m
... if matched sample 0.017 0.128 1.67m
Protected (2001) 0.225 0.417 0.79m
Protected (2010) 0.437 0.496 0.79m
Coordinate Level Level Use Sequences (2001-2005 and 2008-2012)
Sequence Indicates Permanently Forested 0.686 0.464 1.58m
... if matched sample 0.886 0.317 0.33m
Sequence Indicates Temporary Deforestation 0.028 0.165 1.58m
... if matched sample 0.016 0.127 0.33m
Sequence Indicates Temporary Deforestation 0.286 0.452 1.58m
... if matched sample 0.098 0.297 0.33m
Unless otherwise indicated, Land Conflict and Other Municipal data provided for the 792 munici-
palities in the Amazon states for 1997-2010. Land conflict data from the CPT. Escalation is the sum
of land-related murders, attempted murders and death threats. Violence is the sum of murders and
death threats, and hence captures serious violence. Disputes captures total the number of land-
related disagreements for a variety of reasons. Homicide data is from the Mortality Information
System. Environmental fines are from IBAMA. GDP data is from IBGE, public expenditure data is
from Brollo et al. (2013). The Protected Share of Land is the share of a municipality that is under eco-
logical or indigenous protection. Coordinate level land cover data are dummies based on groupings
of MODIS classifications as described in Section 2.3. Coordinate level sequences are dummies based
on grouping of sequences of land cover data as described in Online Appendix Section A.3.
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Table 2: Protection and Land Related Conflict in the Amazon States
Aggregated Violence Disaggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Murders Attempts Threats Disputes
A. Panel Regression Results
Protected Share -0.208 -0.071** -0.047** -0.020 -0.051* -0.137 -0.183
(0.139) (0.035) (0.020) (0.018) (0.026) (0.131) (0.172)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .0257 .0195 .128 .315
N 11088 11088 11088 11088 11088 11088 11088
Municipalities 792 792 792 792 792 792 792
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event Study Results
Protected Share -0.605*** -0.156** -0.097** -0.070* -0.085** -0.449** -0.773***
(0.233) (0.063) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039) (0.200) (0.183)
Mean of DV .332 .0977 .0474 .0595 .0382 .234 .406
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98
Municipalities 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
Protected Areas 209 209 209 209 209 209 209
Observations 8722 8722 8722 8722 8722 8722 8722
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions on outcome measures indicating land-related conflict in the Amazon
states. Land conflict data from the CPT. Data covers 1997-2010. Panel A presents results for the municipality level bal-
anced panel. Panel B presents the results from the quasi-event study specification. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level (panel A) and two-way clustered at the municipality and protected area levels (panel B). Stars indicate
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Some Violence May be Diverted to Nearby Areas
Aggregated Violence Other
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Panel Estimation
Protected Share -0.211 -0.072** -0.047** -0.177
(0.140) (0.035) (0.020) (0.171)
0 < DTPA < 10km 0.040 0.014 0.008 -0.092
(0.070) (0.022) (0.011) (0.149)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .315
Observations 11088 11088 11088 11088
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event (plus 1st degree adjacent municipalities)
Protected Share -0.314* -0.044 -0.029 -0.317**
(0.171) (0.036) (0.020) (0.150)
Mean of DV .299 .0884 .0424 .378
Observations 43064 43064 43064 43064
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value from F-test of T2B - T3B = 0 0.31 0.13 0.11 0.05**
C. Quasi-Event (plus 2nd degree adjacent municipalities)
Protected Share -0.315** -0.068* -0.041** -0.275
(0.124) (0.038) (0.020) (0.185)
Mean of DV .296 .0871 .0415 .368
Observations 108654 108654 108654 108654
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value from F-test of T2B - T3C = 0 0.27 0.23 0.19 0.06*
p-value from F-test of T3B - T3C = 0 1.00 0.65 0.66 0.09
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions on outcome measures indicating land-
related conflict in the Amazon states. Land conflict data from the CPT. Data covers 1997-
2010. Panel A provides estimates based on our panel specification. (0 < DTPA ≤ 10km)
is the share of land in a municipality that is within 10km. The average municipality year
observation has 13% of its land within 10km of a protected area (compared to an average
of 20% of land actually under protection. Panel B estimates the quasi-event study speci-
fication including municipalities adjacent to the municipalities intersecting each protected
area as additional controls. Panel C also includes municipalities adjacent to these adjacent
municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level (panel A) and two-
way clustered at the municipality and protected area levels (panels B and C). Additional
statistical tests report p-values from F-tests comparing comparable coefficients between dif-
ferent panels of tables 2 and 3 based on stacked regressions. For example, the p-value in
the escalation column of panel B indicates the result of a test comparing the coefficient of
protected share reported in panel B, to the coefficient on protected share in the escalation
column of Table 2 panel B. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Protection Not Accompanied by Changes in Total Homicide Rates,
Environmental Enforcement, Economic Output or the Size of Government
Homicides Enviro. Fines Output Public Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Indian All Flora GDP Ag. VA VA Exp.
A. Panel Regression Results
Protected Share -3.578 0.044 9.861 5.900 0.019 0.062 0.001 -0.118
(3.456) (0.052) (6.406) (5.420) (0.063) (0.111) (0.034) (0.081)
Mean of DV 6.48 .0301 12.7 9.55 10.9 9.57 9.66 16.9
Municipalities 792 792 792 792 792 792 792 783
Observations 11088 11088 11088 11088 9504 9504 9504 7728
Muncipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event Study Results
Protected Share -3.144 0.073 -5.316 -6.567 -0.009 -0.040 0.031 -0.016
(2.046) (0.078) (5.274) (4.693) (0.071) (0.144) (0.052) (0.079)
Mean of DV 7.38 .101 23.8 17.9 11.3 9.81 10.2 10.2
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.97
Municipalities 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 281
Protected Areas 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 207
Observations 8722 8722 8722 8722 7476 7476 7476 5935
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating protected status to various municipal level outcome
measures. Data on municipal level homicides is from the Mortality Information System (1997-2010). Data on
environmental fines was obtained from IBAMA (1997-2010), the outcome variable is a count of either the total
number of fines issued, or the number of fines relating to flora offences. Data on total value added (GDP),
agricultural value added (Ag. VA) and public sector value added are from IBGE (1999-2010). As GDP data is
only available from 1999 there are fewer observations in Columns 5-7. Data on public sector expenditures in
column (8) are from Brollo et al. (2013). This data is available from 2000-2010, and not for all municipalities,
so there are still fewer observations in Column 8. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level (panel
A) and two-way clustered at the municipality and protected area levels (panel B). Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Ecological and Indigenous Protected Areas Have a Similar Effects
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Panel Regression Results
Protected Share -0.178 -0.081* -0.054** -0.182
(Ecological) (0.172) (0.044) (0.025) (0.261)
Protected Share -0.293 -0.057 -0.036 -0.169
(Tribal) (0.195) (0.050) (0.033) (0.130)
p-value from F-test of PS(eco)=PS(tri) .63 .71 .67 .96
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .315
N 11088 11088 11088 11088
Municipalities 792 792 792 792
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event Study Results
Protected Share -0.518* -0.116 -0.073** -1.036***
(Ecological) (0.306) (0.073) (0.031) (0.229)
Protected Share -0.700** -0.199** -0.123* -0.484**
(Tribal) (0.332) (0.091) (0.064) (0.218)
p-value from F-test of PS(eco)=PS(tri) .68 .43 .45 .08
Mean of DV .332 .0977 .0474 .406
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98
Municipalities 285 285 285 285
Protected Areas 209 209 209 209
Observations 8722 8722 8722 8722
Protected Area x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area x Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period 1997-
2010 using the panel specification in Panel A and the quasi-event study specification as
in Panel B of Table 2. The difference here is that in separate out the effect of protected
areas which are established for the purpose for protecting indigenous lands, or on environ-
mentally protected areas. p-value equal coefficients provides the p-value associated with an
F-test of equality of coefficients for Protected Share (Ecological) and Protected Share (Tribal).
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in Panel A and adjusted for two-way
clustering at the municipality and protected area levels in Panel B and C with stars indicating
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Protection and Changes in Forest Cover and Land Use
Forested Perm. Def. Temp. Def. Perm. Forest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Newly Protected 0.015*** 0.019*** -0.016*** -0.008* 0.008*** 0.005** 0.008** 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
N 793928 167336 792317 167147 792317 167147 792317 167147
Mean of DV -.026 -.0059 .0226 .00725 -.0103 -.00412 -.0123 -.00313
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Observations Only Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating changes is protected status to changes in forest cover
or land use sequence type. The data is a random sample of coordinates from across the Brazilian Amazon. The
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is a categorical variable indicating whether the coordinate was reforested
(1), deforested (-1), or had no change in forest cover status (0) between 2001 and 2010. The dependent variable in
columns 3 to 8 is a categorical variable which takes the difference between dummies indicating whether 5 year
sequences of land cover types best indicate permanent deforestation (columns 3 and 4), temporary deforestation
(columns 5 and 6) or permanent forest cover (columns 7 and 8) for the periods 2001-05 and 2008-12. For even
numbered columns, we restrict the sample to a coordinates which were protected between 2001 and 2010 and
a matched set of coordinates that were either never protected or always protected. Matching was on the basis
of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A10 for the matching regression) and we retain only matched
pairs with absolute differences in propensity score of less than 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Online Appendices
(Not for publication.)
A Data Appendix
A.1 Building the Municipality Level Conflict Panel
We obtain data on land conflict from the Annual Reports of the Comissao Pastoral
da Terra (CPT). The CPT was founded by the Catholic Church to highlight the
plight of landless workers, small farmers and squatters. Since 1985, it has published
an annual report on Conflitos no Campo (Violence in the Countryside). The report
includes a multitude of conflict measures. We focus on the set of conflict measures
that have been reported consistently between 1997 and 2010. The variables are
‘Disputes’, ‘Murders’, ‘Attempted Murders’ and ‘Death threats’. We discuss how
each variable is constructed in turn.
Disputes This is a general measure of land conflicts and ongoing (legal) disputes
between individuals or legal entities claiming title to land. These were contained
in the original documents under the headings ‘Conflitos por Terra’ from 1997-2004
and ‘Areas em conflito’ from 2004-2010. Under the heading land conflicts are sub-
sumed all incidences relating to ‘land conflict’, which are broadly defined as actions
to resist and confront the possession, use and ownership of land when involving
squatters, settlers of, quilombos (descendants of freed slaves), colonisers, small
leaseholders, small proprietors, occupiers, landless and rubber tappers. Through-
out, the CPT records a conflict in a given year if that conflict broke out in that year;
old and unresolved conflicts are only included in a given report if there has been a
significant event relating to it.
For each conflict, we have the following information:
• State
• Municipality Name
• Name of conflict, typically relating to the name of a farm or location descrip-
tion.
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• Date of dispute recorded
• Area in dispute (often missing)
• Number of families affected (often missing)
Murders, Attempted Murders and Death Threats Throughout the time period,
we have data for Murders (Assassinatos), Attempted Murders (Tentativas de As-
sassinato) and Death Threats (Ameacados de Morte). For each event, we have the
following information.
• State
• Municipality name
• Name of conflict
• Date of event
• Name of victim
• Age of victim (often missing)
• Category of victim, e.g. land less, occupier, fisherman, indigenous, rural
labourer (often missing)
We create a variable called ‘Escalations’, which combines Murders, Attempted
Murders and Death Threats into a single time-varying measure at the municipality
level, and a variable called ‘Violence’ which combines Murders and Attempted
Murders.
Matching to 2000 Census Municipalities We use the 2013 shapefile of adminis-
trative boundaries for Brazilian municipalities to provide a gazetteer of municipal-
ity names for the states in the Amazon states. This can be thought of as the most
extensive list of municipality names, as when a municipality splits, one usually
retains the name of the original municipality. While there have been a signifi-
cant number of municipality splits in the early 1990s, few new municipalities were
created since 2000. We match conflict events to municipalities performing fuzzy
string matching on the set of municipality names within the state in which the con-
flict event was recorded. This creates a mapping matching conflict events to 2013
municipality names. We then build a cross walk to match 2013 municipalities to
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municipalities in the 2000 census shapefile. We use this to build a balanced panel
across 792 municipalities in the Amazon states for the period 1997-2010 for the
conflict variables described above.
A.2 Construction of Protected Area Data
Data on protected areas was produced by combining digital maps from several
sources. The principal source was the UN World Database of Protected Areas. This
database provide a digital map outlining the original extent ecologically protected
areas in Brazil created up to 2007 and tribally protected areas designated up to
2010.
To calculate the area in a municipality under protection in say 2003, we simply
calculate the total area in a municipality covered by one or more protected areas
established up to (and including) 2003. For around 3% of reserves, data on the
start date is missing. We assume these reserves came into existence prior to 1997
(i.e. before the start of our panel). For some of the reserves, we have been able to
verify that this was indeed the case, but to the extent that some were established
subsequently, this assumption introduces measurement error into our protected
area data.
We supplement the data on ecological areas with data from the Brazilian Min-
iste`rio do Meio Ambiente (Environment Ministry). Despite being based on the
same underlying set of polygons, the Environment Ministry data includes the ex-
tent of protected areas in 2014, rather than their original extents. This means that if
a new protected area X supersedes part of an existing protected area, following the
procedure used on the UN data would mean we would erroneously assign land to
unprotected status for the years up to the establishment of X. We try to minimise
this by using the UN data to provide a baseline extent of protection in 2007. So, for
2008, we then add areas that the Environment Ministry data suggests would have
been protected in 2008 to the areas the UN data indicates were protected in 2007.19
Thus, we are only using the data on current extent of protected areas for the most
recent few years, when the problem of new protected areas superseding old ones
19Note, because the data are based on the same underlying sources, that the UN data indicates
is protected is a superset of that indicated by the Environment Brazilian Data—it is all the areas
still protected by the same park in 2014 plus the areas where the identity of the protected area had
changed, but protection status did not.
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is relatively small.
A.3 Land Use Patterns Classification
To study the effect of protection on permanent relative to temporary deforestation,
we need to consider land use for periods longer than one year. To begin with,
we categorise land use into three broad classes, Forested, Shrubland or Cropland
(as described in Section 2.3). We can then generate sequences of patterns that are
suggestive of either permanent deforestation and settled agriculture, temporary
deforestation (e.g. due to selective logging, or short term agriculture), or perma-
nent forest cover. For example, a pattern such as FSCCC suggests that an initially
forested coordinate was cleared and converted to cropland in the course of a five
year period. On the other hand, a pattern such as FSSFF, suggests that a coordi-
nate was temporarily cleared, with the forest regrowing. Clearly, the first pattern
suggests stationary land use by a farmer, while the second may indicate temporary
extraction of valuable timber.
In order to study patterns of land use, we need to categorise or group repeating
patterns into use clusters. Given that we have data for 12 years, we can create two
sets of such five letter series and categorise the resulting patterns into permanent
forest cover, temporary deforestation, or permanent deforestation, and then study,
how conservation changes this pattern. The resulting state space S = {F, S, C} ×
...× {F, S, C} can have at most 35 = 243 different series; the data almost exhausts
the state space, with 242 distinct series.
The idea is to group series together into dominant clusters. This could be done
manually, but would likely be subjective from case to case. In order to arrive at
an objective grouping, we apply a powerful tool from machine learning: k-means
clustering.
K-means clustering solves a simple optimisation problem, assigning observa-
tions to clusters C1, ..., CK, such that the total within-cluster variation is minimised,
i.e.
min
C1,...,Ck
K
∑
k=1
W(Ck)
where
W(Ck) = ∑
i∈Ck
p
∑
j=1
(xij − x¯kj)2
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For a given number of clusters K, the solution is an assignment of data co-
ordinates xi to clusters C1, ..., CK, which maximises intra-cluster homogeneity and
minimises inter-cluster similarity. There exist fast implementations of K-means
clustering algorithms in statistical programming packages, which provide a local
approximation to the above optimisation problem. These algorithms are guaran-
teed to converge to a local optimum; performing multiple iterations with different
initial conditions ensures that the routine does not converge to a particularly bad
local optimum.
In order to separate the data, we need to extract numeric information from
the five character length series, which may be informative about the underlying
transitions and land use patterns. We construct eight numeric variables: Number
of transitions to state F, number of transitions from state F to some other state, the
number of times the coordinate is in state F, an indicator for whether the series
is ever in state C, the number of times the coordinate is in state S, the number of
repeating non F states and the number of repeating F states, as well as the length
of repeating pairs (to capture regularity e.g. in patterns such as SCSCS).
As noted, the number K is a choice and, mechanically, larger values of K im-
prove the fit (for K = n, each observation would be its own cluster and the ob-
jective function would be minimal at zero). In order to estimate the total num-
ber of clusters, we perform the statistical test described by Tibshirani et al. (2001),
which computes a measure of goodness of clustering. The idea of the test is sim-
ple: for every number of clusters k it computes the gap between the expected
value of the objective function and the actual, f (k) = E∗[log(W(k))]− log(W(k)),
where E∗[log(W(k))] is obtained via bootstrapping. A large value of f (k) indi-
cates that we are overfitting the data. As a decision criterion for the optimal
number K∗, Tibshirani et al. (2001) propose to choose the smallest k such that
f (k) ≥ f (k+ 1)− se( fk+1). This choice effectively requires that the improvement in
the sum of the within cluster variations for k clusters needs to within one standard
deviation of the increase that is expected with k + 1 clusters
Throughout, we see that the optimal number of clusters is K = 6. Table A8
below provides details over how well the clustering performs in terms of separating
five letter sequences into dominant clusters based on the measures xi. Clusters 1
through 3 can clearly be interpreted as permanent deforestation clusters; they will
have, at any point, been assigned a status of being cropped and their sequence
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is dominated by repetitions of states S and C. Cluster 4 could arguably capture
permanent or temporary deforestation. The dominant states are F and S, with the
state C being rarely observed. Cluster 5 has a significant number of transitions to
and from states F, consistent with periodic temporary deforestation. Cluster 6 is
clearly permanently forested, with very rare instances of coordinates transitioning
from F to C state. Table A9 presents the most common five letter sequences and
their respective overall or within cluster shares.
As mentioned, it is not clear whether temporary or permanent deforestation
is the best way to describe the sequences in cluster 4. In the baseline table we
classify it as ‘permanent deforestation’ (the broad definition of permanent defor-
estation). However, the results are robust to classifying it as temporary deforesta-
tion (the broad definition of temporary deforestation), or as neither permanent or
temporary deforestation (the narrow definition of both temporary and permanent
deforestation). Table A14 contains these results.
B Description of Additional Robustness Checks
B.1 Robustness to Allowing for Fiscal Transfers Made on the Ba-
sis of Ecological Services
Some states use a small proportion of ICMS (Value Added Tax) revenues to com-
pensate municipalities for the loss of land set aside for environmental protection.
Of the nine Amazon states, five currently apportion revenues some revenues in
this way.20 For three of these states, Acre (2010), Tocantins (2003) and Mato Grosso
(2002), the transfers were introduced within the time period we study. If trans-
fers are made, the size and distribution of the pot varies depending on state law.
Rondonia and Mato Grosso currently make the largest provision, with 5% of ICMS
revenues remitted to municipalities primarily on the basis of protected area. Even
within these states, for most municipalities the amount at stake is small: in Mato
Grosso in 2009, these transfers account for around 1% of municipal revenue and in
84% of municipalities these transfers are less than 5% of revenue.21 Given the large
20The states that currently make transfers of this type are Acre, Tocantins, Mato Grosso, Rondonia
and Amapa. So it is Amazonas, Roraima, Maranhao and Para that do not.
21Author’s calculations based on official data from the Brazilian Institute for Geography and
Statistics (IBGE) and the State Government of Mato Grosso.
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stock of existing protected areas, we think it unlikely that the variation in protected
areas exploited by this study had a substantial effect on either local public finances
or services. Our main analysis thus includes data from all of the Amazon region.
Nevertheless, to mitigate concerns over endogenous municipal budgets, we un-
dertake two exercises. In Table A4 Panel A, we repeat our panel analysis but
include a control which proxies for the value of transfers. Specifically, for each
municipality-year we calculate the share of protected land in the state which is in
the municipality and interact this with the share of state level ICMS revenues that
the state remits on the basis of ecological service provided. The coefficients on our
main variable of interest are robust to the inclusion of this control. If anything,
higher transfers seem to be associated with more violence not less, although given
the scale of our proxy for transfers the economic significance of these findings is
limited. In Table A4 Panel B, we repeat our quasi-event study analysis omitting
protected areas which any part of fall in a state that ever provide transfers. The
results are very similar to those estimated on the full sample.
B.2 Robustness to Controlling for INCRA Activity
Alston et al. (1999, 2000) persuasively argue that the presence of INCRA activity
is an important factor in facilitating land conflict. As the body responsible for ex-
propriating landowners on behalf of settlers, INCRA are a key contributor to weak
property rights in Brazil. Consequently, if INCRA activity tended to be located
far from protected areas, our results could be picking up the pacifying effects of
a lack of INCRA activity, rather than that of secure assignment of property rights
represented by the expansion of protected areas.
To test this, we obtained digital maps of the location of INCRA land reform
settlements. As a proxy for INCRA activity, we produced the share of the surface
of a municipality that was under INCRA settlement for each year in our data. We
distinguish between INCRA settlements inside and outside protected areas. In our
panel specification, we include these INCRA land shares as additional controls. In
our event study specification, we drop protected areas that intersect with INCRA
areas at any time.
Table A7 contains the results. In neither case are our main coefficients of interest
significantly affected. There is, however, suggestive evidence that more INCRA
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activity is associated with higher levels of violence—as found by Alston et al.—but
only when the INCRA settlements are not inside protected areas.
B.3 Robustness of Land Use Change Results
There are at least two concerns that arise from the semi-supervised clustering of
the land use sequences and the subsequent study of patterns of land use change.
First, there is some arbitrariness in terms of the chosen length of sequences that are
clustered into land use types. Second, the creation of longer land use sequences
creates a degree of arbitrariness in terms of the timing of protection status since
it is unclear whether to consider a sequence as treated in case it switched status
halfway through a five letter sequence. We address each of these concerns in turn.
Sequence Length and Clustering We perform clustering on slightly shorter se-
quences of length four, as well as clusters on sequences of length six. As in the main
example for sequences of length five, we perform determine the optimal number of
clusters using the test described in Tibshirani et al. (2001). Throughout, the statis-
tically optimal number of clusters as per the gap statistic test is six. We transform
the six resulting clusters into the three groups of sequences, forested, temporarily
deforested, permanently deforested, and perform the same analysis as in the main
table, relying on variation in the protection status coming from status changes be-
tween 2001 and 2009 for the four letter sequences and on status changes between
2001 and 2006 for the six letter sequences. The results are presented in Table A13
and are consistent with the results presented in our main analysis. Our results are
robust to the choice of sequence length.
Treatment Timing As noted, we infer behavioural changes of settlers by studying
patterns of land use focusing on longer time series of land use patterns. This
creates a degree of arbitrariness in terms of the treatment timing. In the main table
we assign a coordinate as being protected if in the initial year of each five letter
sequence, it was classified as protected. Hence, the resulting variation in protection
status is coming from coordinates whose protection status changed between 2001
and 2008.
In Table A15 we explore other treatment timings. Panel A presents the baseline
results. In Panel B, we narrow in by focusing on coordinates changing protection
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status between 2003 and 2008. Panel C focus on coordinate changing protection sta-
tus between 2003 and 2010 and Panel D exploits the maximal variation by focusing
coordinates changing status between 2001 (first year) and 2010 (last year).
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Table A1: Robustness to Alternative Panel Specifications
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Municipality FE + Time FE
Protected Share -0.113 -0.079*** -0.051*** 0.208
(0.113) (0.026) (0.018) (0.138)
B. Municipality FE + State-by-Time FE
Protected Share -0.208 -0.071** -0.047** -0.183
(0.139) (0.035) (0.020) (0.172)
C. Municipality FE + Time FE + Municipality Trends
Protected Share -0.656** -0.195** -0.111*** 0.018
(0.286) (0.090) (0.043) (0.132)
D. Municipality FE + State-by-Time FE + Municipality Trends
Protected Share -0.556** -0.151* -0.088** -0.033
(0.265) (0.085) (0.038) (0.133)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .315
Observations 11088 11088 11088 11088
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions on different out-
come measures reflecting land-related conflict in the Brazilian Ama-
zon region. The data is a municipal level balanced panel of conflict
data. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A2: Estimating the Panel Specification on the Munic-
ipalities Used for the Event Study Provides Similar Results
to the Baseline Panel Estimates.
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Murders
Protected Share -0.240 -0.085* -0.055** -0.284
(0.183) (0.051) (0.024) (0.179)
Mean of DV .233 .0687 .0338 .395
N 3990 3990 3990 3990
Municipalities 285 285 285 285
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions on different out-
come measures reflecting land-related conflict in the Brazilian Amazon
region. The data is a municipal level balanced panel of conflict data
restricted to the set of municipalities that feature in the quasi-event
specification. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table A3: Robustness: Quasi-Event Alternative Definition of Protected Share
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
Protected Share of Hitherto Unprotected Land -0.358* -0.120** -0.070** -0.543***
(0.185) (0.054) (0.032) (0.138)
Mean of DV .33 .0962 .0465 .39
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.92 2.92 2.92 2.92
Municipalities 264 264 264 264
Protected Areas 199 199 199 199
Observations 8148 8148 8148 8148
Protected Area x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area x Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period 1997-2010 using
the quasi-event study specification as in Panel B of Table 2. In that table, the variable of interest
was the share of all land in a municipality that is newly protected, here it is the share of land in
a municipality that was unprotected last year that is newly protected. Compared to the the main
results, this change in variable is expected to mechanically reduce the estimated coefficients, as the
rescaling increases the variance of our independent variable without affecting the variance of our
outcome. There are 574 fewer observations in this specification as we can no longer calculate the
share of land protected for protected areas established in 1997. Standard errors two-way clustered at
the municipality and protected area levels with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
51
Table A4: Robustness: Controlling for Ecological Transfers or Dropping
Protected Areas Affected by Them
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Panel: Control For Transfers
Protected Share -0.326* -0.097* -0.073*** -0.096
(0.172) (0.050) (0.027) (0.204)
Fiscal Transfers Proxy 0.065** 0.023 0.012 0.044**
(MSP × State Tax Share) (0.031) (0.014) (0.008) (0.018)
Municipal Share of State 0.789 0.061 0.209 -1.705
Protected Area (MSP) (1.512) (0.448) (0.197) (1.667)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .315
Observations 11088 11088 11088 11088
Muncipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event: Drop Protected Areas That May Have Induced Ecological Transfers
Protected Share -0.707** -0.122* -0.085** -0.666***
(0.280) (0.069) (0.041) (0.168)
Mean of DV .463 .127 .0559 .418
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.92 2.92 2.92 2.92
Municipalities 147 147 147 147
Protected Areas 118 118 118 118
Observations 4816 4816 4816 4816
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period 1997-
2010. Panel A provides results based on the full panel. The municipal level proxy for
fiscal transfers is the interaction between the municipal share of all of a states protected
land and the share of VAT revenues set aside for ecological transfers. Panel B uses the
quasi-event specification as in Panel B of Table 2. The difference here is that protected
areas that have any of their land in states which had positive fiscal transfers at any point
during the sample are excluded. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level (panel
A) or two-way clustered at the municipality and protected area level (panel B) with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Robustness: No Differential Effect After Monitoring Improved
by PPCDAM
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Panel:
Protected Share -0.217 -0.058* -0.041* -0.385
(0.153) (0.035) (0.021) (0.234)
Protected Share 0.012 -0.018 -0.008 0.283
× PPCDAM (Year ≥ 2005) (0.077) (0.016) (0.008) (0.190)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .315
N 11088 11088 11088 11088
Municipalities 792 792 792 792
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event
Protected Share -0.300 -0.115 -0.067* 0.035
(0.215) (0.080) (0.040) (0.101)
Protected Share -0.364 0.146 -0.005 -0.073
× PPCDAM (Year ≥ 2005) (0.551) (0.250) (0.113) (0.139)
Mean of DV .332 .0977 .0474 .0749
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98
Municipalities 285 285 285 285
Protected Areas 209 209 209 209
Observations 8722 8722 8722 8722
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period 1997-
2010. Panel A provides results based on the full panel. Panel B uses the quasi-event
specification as in Panel B of Table 2. PPCDAM capturing years after the establishment
of the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of the Legal Amazon Deforestation (PPC-
DAM was agreed in late 2004). PPCDAM is thought to have reduced deforestation and
improved enforcement of protected areas and forest law. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level (panel A) or two-way clustered at the municipality and protected area
level (panel B) with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Robustness: Dropping Municipalities Which Were Ever Black-
listed for Excessive Deforestaion
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Panel: Dropping Blacklisted Municipalities
Protected Share -0.290** -0.060* -0.048** -0.250
(0.121) (0.033) (0.020) (0.171)
Mean of DV .125 .0289 .0165 .284
Observations 10402 10402 10402 10402
Municipalities 743 743 743 743
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event: Dropping Blacklisted Municipalities
Protected Share -0.521** -0.076 -0.064* -0.772***
(0.263) (0.052) (0.036) (0.195)
Mean of DV .104 .0298 .0157 .279
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96
Municipalities 244 244 244 244
Protected Areas 170 170 170 170
Observations 7056 7056 7056 7056
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period 1997-
2010. Panel A provides results based on the full panel. We drop 50 municipalities that
from 2008 onwards were on a blacklist of municipalities due to bad performance in terms
of deforestation and environmental protection. Panel B uses the quasi-event specification
as in Panel B of Table 2. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level (panel A) or two-
way clustered at the municipality and protected area level (panel B) with stars indicating
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A7: Robustness: Controlling for INCRA settlement expansion across
municipalities inside and outside of protected areas.
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Panel: Controlling for INCRA settlements
Protected Share -0.157 -0.066* -0.043** -0.240
(0.135) (0.035) (0.020) (0.214)
INCRA (and Unprotected) Share 0.458** 0.081 0.035 0.184
(0.230) (0.065) (0.028) (0.306)
INCRA (and Protected) Share -0.319 0.009 -0.013 1.177
(0.227) (0.066) (0.027) (1.499)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .315
Observations 11088 11088 11088 11088
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event: Dropping events affected by INCRA settlements
Protected Share -0.497 -0.190** -0.150** -1.083***
(0.413) (0.080) (0.066) (0.370)
Mean of DV .201 .0558 .0299 .342
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67
Municipalities 155 155 155 155
Protected Areas 96 96 96 96
Observations 3584 3584 3584 3584
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period 1997-
2010. Panel A provides results based on the full panel, controlling for the share of a
municipalities surface area that is dedicated to INCRA settlements lying inside or outside
of protected areas. Panel B performs the quasi-event specification as in Panel B of Table 2,
with the exception that we remove individual protected area events that are in some way
affected by having (mostly small amounts) of INCRA activity within their boundaries.
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level (panel A) or two-way clustered at the
municipality and protected area level (panel B) with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A8: K-Means Clusters and Separation on Features
Clustering Variables
Cluster Interpretation to F from F Ever C len(F) len(S) len(repeat S, C) len(repeat F) repeat pairs Freq
1 Permanent Deforestation 0.056 0.204 1.000 0.157 3.361 4.668 0.000 0.229 SC 1.4%
2 Permanent Deforestation 0.155 0.416 1.000 0.495 0.676 4.467 0.216 0.147 C 1.9%
3 Permanent Deforestation 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.000 5.000 5.000 0.000 0.000 S 20.5%
4 Permanent/Temporary 0.493 1.012 0.064 1.545 3.387 3.400 0.653 0.215 FS 0.7%
5 Temporary Deforestation 0.466 0.984 0.222 3.430 1.236 1.454 3.151 0.057 FS 1.1%
6 Forest 0.001 0.002 0.002 4.998 0.000 0.000 4.998 0.000 F 74.4%
Notes: Table presents the eight numeric features used to represent the land cover sequences of length five. The eight features are: the number
of transitions to state F, the number of transitions from F, whether the sequence was ever in state C, the overall length in state S, the length in
repeated non F states, the length of repeating F states and the length of repeating pairs. These features were used to separate the individual
sequences into six different clusters using the k-means clustering algorithm as implemented by Hartigan and Wong (1979). The table presents
the mean of each clustering variable indicated in the column head in the respective cluster. This allows an understanding of which features help
in separating the individual clusters.
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Table A9: K-Means Clusters and common class sequences
Cluster Interpretation Sequence Share within cluster Overall share N
1 Permanent Deforestation SSSSC 18.4% 0.8% 11081
1 Permanent Deforestation CSSSS 15.5% 0.6% 9344
1 Permanent Deforestation SSSCC 12.8% 0.5% 7699
1 Permanent Deforestation SSSCS 12.0% 0.5% 7219
1 Permanent Deforestation CCSSS 11.4% 0.5% 6864
1 Permanent Deforestation SCSSS 6.1% 0.3% 3677
1 Permanent Deforestation SSCSS 3.7% 0.2% 2226
1 Permanent Deforestation SCSCS 3.7% 0.2% 2206
1 Permanent Deforestation CSSSC 2.7% 0.1% 1649
1 Permanent Deforestation SSCCS 2.6% 0.1% 1585
2 Permanent Deforestation SSSSS 100.0% 20.5% 297609
3 Permanent Deforestation CCCCC 39.5% 1.9% 27451
3 Permanent Deforestation CCCSS 8.0% 0.4% 5537
3 Permanent Deforestation SSCCC 7.5% 0.4% 5216
3 Permanent Deforestation SCCCC 6.9% 0.3% 4785
3 Permanent Deforestation CCCCS 6.3% 0.3% 4413
3 Permanent Deforestation CCCSC 4.5% 0.2% 3161
3 Permanent Deforestation SCCCS 2.9% 0.1% 1991
3 Permanent Deforestation CCCFF 2.4% 0.1% 1691
3 Permanent Deforestation CSCSC 2.3% 0.1% 1604
3 Permanent Deforestation CSCCC 2.3% 0.1% 1585
4 Permanent/Temporary FSSSS 20.8% 0.4% 5474
4 Permanent/Temporary FFSSS 16.8% 0.3% 4413
4 Permanent/Temporary SSSSF 15.8% 0.3% 4163
4 Permanent/Temporary SSSFF 11.3% 0.2% 2957
4 Permanent/Temporary SSSFS 5.2% 0.1% 1374
4 Permanent/Temporary FSSSF 4.0% 0.1% 1053
4 Permanent/Temporary FSFSF 3.2% 0.1% 830
4 Permanent/Temporary SFSSS 3.0% 0.1% 775
4 Permanent/Temporary SSFSS 2.9% 0.1% 760
4 Permanent/Temporary SSFSF 2.3% 0.0% 598
5 Temporary Deforestation FFFSS 18.3% 0.6% 8153
5 Temporary Deforestation FFFFS 16.5% 0.5% 7351
5 Temporary Deforestation SFFFF 11.2% 0.3% 4997
5 Temporary Deforestation SSFFF 7.5% 0.2% 3360
5 Temporary Deforestation FFFSF 7.0% 0.2% 3111
5 Temporary Deforestation CCFFF 4.8% 0.1% 2143
5 Temporary Deforestation FFFCC 4.1% 0.1% 1814
5 Temporary Deforestation FSFFF 4.1% 0.1% 1804
5 Temporary Deforestation FFSFF 2.2% 0.1% 977
5 Temporary Deforestation FFFSC 1.9% 0.1% 848
6 Forest FFFFF 99.5% 74.4% 1081436
6 Forest CFFFF 0.2% 0.2% 2605
6 Forest FFFFC 0.2% 0.1% 2090
6 Forest FFCFF 0.0% 0.0% 271
Notes: Table presents the results from performing k-means clustering on land
cover sequences of length five. The optimal number of clusters as determined us-
ing the gap statistic test in Tibshirani et al. (2001) is six. The ten (or less in case
there are fewer than 10 sequences types per cluster) most frequent sequences that
comprise each cluster and their respective share within and across the clusters is
provided. We interpret the six clustered sequences as being either Forest, Tempo-
rary Deforestation or Permanent Deforestation.
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Table A10: Matching Regression: Where Gets Protected?
Change in Protected Status Between 2001 and 2010 Dummy
(1)
ln(KM to River + 1) -0.067*
(0.035)
ln(KM to Road + 1) 0.124
(0.080)
Mean Elevation -0.000
(0.000)
Var Elevation 0.015**
(0.007)
Longitude (x) -0.125***
(0.029)
Latitude (y) -0.064*
(0.034)
ln(GAEZ Yield Cassava +1) 0.464
(1.386)
ln(GAEZ Yield Maize +1) 0.036
(0.416)
ln(GAEZ Yield Wetland Rice +1) 1.772
(1.811)
ln(GAEZ Yield Soybean +1) 0.449
(0.510)
ln(GAEZ Yield Oil Palm +1) -0.072***
(0.025)
ln(GAEZ Yield Dryland Rice +1) 0.476
(0.607)
ln(max{GAEZ Yield x Price} +1) 2.064***
(0.601)
Annual Temperature Average -0.042
(0.038)
Annual Rainfall Average -0.000
(0.000)
Annual Rainfall Standard Deviation 0.002*
(0.001)
Distance to Nightlights 0.092***
(0.015)
(Distance to Nightlights)2 -0.001***
(0.000)
Forested (MODIS) 0.313***
(0.084)
Shrubland (MODIS) 0.190*
(0.109)
Cropland (MODIS) -0.127
(0.148)
N 791406
Meso Region Dummies Yes
Notes: Results from a probit regression. Outcome is a dummy indicating whether the protection status
changed between 2001 and 2010. These changes are all changes from ‘unprotected’ status to ‘protected’
status. Propensity scores obtained from this regression used to construct the matched panel. Each
observation is a randomly drawn coordinate within the Amazon states. Distances are straight-line
distances to the nearest river (Natural Earth V. 3), national highway in 2001 (algorithmically generated
based on maps and descriptions obtained from DNIT) and night-lights in 1999-2001 (from DMSP).
Initial land cover from MODIS. Mean and Variance of elevation from GMTED. Yields are obtained from
the FAO’s GAEZ database which provides theoretical yields for a range of crops based on agronomic
models and geographic inputs. Climatic variable are from MOD11A1 Land surface and CHIRPS for
rainfall. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p <
0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A11: Protection and Changes in Forest Cover: Ro-
bustness to other propensity score cutoffs
Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (3)
A. Propensity score < 0.1
Newly Protected 0.015*** -0.007** 0.004** 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
N 253836 253627 253627 253627
Mean of DV -.00484 .00538 -.00287 -.00251
B. Propensity score < 0.01
Newly Protected 0.018*** -0.008** 0.005** 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
N 198768 198575 198575 198575
Mean of DV -.0059 .00671 -.00349 -.00322
C. Propensity score < 0.001
Newly Protected 0.019*** -0.008* 0.005** 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
N 159848 159660 159660 159660
Mean of DV -.00602 .0074 -.0042 -.00319
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Observations Only Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating changes in
protected status to changes forest cover. The data is a random sam-
ple of 793,928 coordinates across the Brazilian Amazon. The outcome
variable is a categorical variable indicating whether the coordinate was
reforested (1), deforested (-1), or had no change in forest cover sta-
tus (0). Coordinates which were protected between 2001 and 2010 are
matched to observationally identical coordinates that were either never
protected or always protected on the basis of propensity scores (see On-
line Appendix Table A10 for the matching regression). We retain only
matched pairs with absolute differences in propensity score less than
indicated. Our baseline matched sample results were calculated with
a propensity score cutoff of 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. Stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A12: Protection and Changes in Land Use Pat-
terns: Robustness to propensity score cutoffs
Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Forested Temp. Def. Perm. Def.
A. Propensity score < 0.1
Newly Protected 0.003 0.004** -0.007**
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
N 253627 253627 253627
Mean of DV -.00251 -.00287 .00538
B. Propensity score < 0.01
Newly Protected 0.003 0.005** -0.008**
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
N 198575 198575 198575
Mean of DV -.00322 -.00349 .00671
C. Propensity score < 0.0001
Newly Protected 0.003 0.005** -0.008*
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
N 159660 159660 159660
Mean of DV -.00319 -.0042 .0074
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating
changes in protected status to changes in land use sequence type.
The data is a random sample of 793,928 coordinates across the
Brazilian Amazon. Two five year sequences are used for each co-
ordinate, 2001-2005 and 2008-2012. The land use sequences are
categorised into three groups, stable forest, temporarily defor-
ested and permanently deforested, using the approach described
in A.3. The dependent variable is a categorical variable which
takes the difference between dummies indicating a particular
classification. The independent variable indicates whether the
coordinate was protected between 2001 and 2008 (the first year
of each five year sequence). Coordinates which were protected
between 2001 and 2010 are matched to observationally identical
coordinates that were either never protected or always protected
on the basis of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A10
for the matching regression). We retain only matched pairs with
absolute differences in propensity score of less than indicated.
We match on changes between 2001 and 2010 for consistency
with Table 6. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A13: Protection and Changes in Land Use Patterns: Robustness to the choice
of sequence length
Full Sample Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forested Temp. Def. Perm Def. Forested Temp. Def. Perm Def.
A. Sequence of length 6
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.009*** -0.017*** 0.006 0.002 -0.008**
Between 2001 and 2007 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0117 -.0107 .0224 -.00418 -.00291 .00708
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
B. Sequence of length 4
Newly Protected 0.009** 0.007*** -0.014*** 0.006 0.003 -0.009**
Between 2001 and 2009 (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0155 -.00823 .0213 -.00325 -.00392 .00612
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Sample Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating changes in protected status to changes
in land use sequence type. The data is a random sample of 793,928 coordinates across the Brazilian
Amazon. We use two sequences of land use for each coordinate. In panel A, these are 2001-2006
and 2007-2012, in panel B these are 2001-2004 and 2009-2012. The land use sequences are categorised
into three groups, stable forest, temporarily deforested and permanently deforested, using the ap-
proach described in A.3. The dependent variable is a categorical variable which takes the difference
between dummies indicating a particular classification. The independent variable is a dummy indicat-
ing whether a coordinate was protected. In columns 4-6, coordinates which were protected between
2001 and 2010 are matched to observationally identical coordinates that were either never protected or
always protected on the basis of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A10 for the matching
regression). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Stars indicating *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A14: Protection and Changes in Land Use Patterns: Robustness to narrow and
broad definitions of temporary and permanent deforestation
Full Sample Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forested Temp. Def. Perm Def. Forested Temp. Def. Perm Def.
A. Narrow Temporary Deforestation, Broad Permanent Deforestation
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.008*** -0.016*** 0.003 0.005** -0.008*
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0123 -.0103 .0226 -.00313 -.00412 .00725
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
B. Broad Temporary Deforestation, Narrow Permanent Deforestation
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.006*** -0.014*** 0.003 0.006* -0.009**
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0123 -.00854 .0208 -.00313 -.00332 .00646
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
C. Narrow Temporary Deforestation, Narrow Permanent Deforestation
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.008*** -0.014*** 0.003 0.005** -0.009**
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0123 -.0103 .0208 -.00313 -.00412 .00646
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Sample Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating changes protected status to changes in land
use sequence type. The data is a random sample of 793,928 coordinates across the Brazilian Amazon.
Two five year sequences are used for each coordinate, 2001-2005 and 2008-2012. The land use se-
quences are categorised into three groups, stable forest, temporarily deforested and permanently de-
forested, using the approach described in A.3. The dependent variable is a categorical variable which
takes the difference between dummies indicating a particular classification. The different panels use
either the broad or narrow definitions of forested and temporary deforestation. The independent
variable is a dummy indicating whether a coordinate was protected between 2001 and 2008 (the first
year of each sequence). In columns 4-6, coordinates which were protected between 2001 and 2010
are matched to observationally identical coordinates that were either never protected or always pro-
tected on the basis of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A10 for the matching regression).
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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Table A15: Protection and Changes in Land Use Patterns: Robustness to the
choice of treatment timing
Full Sample Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forested Temp. Def. Perm. Def. Forested Temp. Def. Perm. Def.
2001-2008
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.008*** -0.016*** 0.003 0.005** -0.008*
Between Years (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
2001-2010
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.008*** -0.016*** 0.004 0.005** -0.009**
Between Years (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
2003-2008
Newly Protected 0.011** 0.008*** -0.019*** 0.002 0.004* -0.006
Between Years (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
2003-2010
Newly Protected 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.018*** 0.002 0.004* -0.006
Between Years (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0123 -.0103 .0226 -.00313 -.00412 .00725
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Sample Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating protected status to changes in land use
sequence type. The data is a random sample of 793,928 coordinates across the Brazilian Amazon.
Two five year sequences are used for each coordinate, 2001-2005 and 2008-2012. The land use se-
quences are categorised into three groups, stable forest, temporarily deforested and permanently
deforested, using the approach described in A.3. The dependent variable is a categorical variable
which takes the difference between dummies indicating a particular classification. The indepen-
dent variable indicates whether the coordinate was protected between the years indicated. For
columns 4-6, coordinates which were protected between 2001 and 2010 are matched to observa-
tionally identical coordinates that were either never protected or always protected on the basis
of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A10 for the matching regression). We retain
only matched pairs with absolute differences in propensity score of less than 0.001. We match on
changes between 2001 and 2010 for consistency with Table 6. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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